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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Thank you Chairman Skelton, Representative Hunter, and members of 
the House Armed Services Committee for inviting me to speak to you today.  
I appreciate the time and attention that your Committee is devoting to the 
legal and human rights crisis surrounding the detainees at Guantánamo Bay.  
 
On November 28, 2001, I testified before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee about the President’s then two-week-old plan to try suspected 
terrorists before ad hoc military commissions.  I warned the Committee that 
our Constitution precluded the President from unilaterally establishing 
military tribunals and that the structural provisions employed by our 
Founders required these tribunals to be set up by Congress.  On June 29, 
2006, the Supreme Court agreed in a case I argued, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).  The Hamdan decision invalidated the makeshift 
tribunal scheme devised by presidential fiat alone.   
 
 Indeed, every time the Supreme Court has ruled on the merits 
regarding the Executive Branch’s procedures for detainees, it has found 
them lacking, forcing Congress and the Executive back to the drawing board 
at great expense to the nation in terms of money, time, and the trust of the 
American people.  The latest event occurred last month, when the Supreme 
Court struck down a key part of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
(“MCA”) in Boumediene v. Bush. 
 
  2 
The basic question I am here to answer today is: What changed after 
Boumediene v. Bush?  The simple answer is: Everything.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Boumediene profoundly affects the detainees currently 
held at Guantanamo Bay and the Military Commission system established to 
try many of them for war crimes.  The case marked the fourth time in as 
many years that the Supreme Court rejected the government’s attempts to 
defend its Guantanamo Bay policy.  A clear pattern has emerged.  Each 
subsequent decision has further chipped away at the foundation of that 
policy.  Despite the familiar result, Boumediene nevertheless was unique, as 
it was the first Guantanamo-related case the Court heard after Congress 
passed the MCA.  The Court invalidated part of that law as unconstitutional, 
in the process emphasizing that the Constitution applies to Guantanamo Bay.  
As a result, it is now clear that detainees held at Guantanamo Bay have a 
constitutionally-protected right to have an Article III court review the 
legality of their detention in a habeas corpus action.  The practical 
implications of the case do not end there.  The Court’s holding in 
Bouemediene did more than invalidate a single section of the MCA; it 
stripped away the veneer to expose the eroding foundation of the military 
commission system.    
 
In this testimony, I will make four points: (1) the Boumediene 
decision has called into question the foundational assumption on which the 
MCA is based, that the Constitution and treaties of the United States do not 
protect detainees at Guantanamo Bay; (2) the MCA unconstitutionally 
discriminates against noncitizens; (3) Congress, after careful deliberation, 
should take up legislation to follow Boumediene and balance national 
security and civil liberties concerns; and (4) legislation should make clear 
that the military commission process is no substitute for the Great Writ of 
habeas corpus.   
 
The Constitution Now Applies to Guantanamo Bay 
 
The MCA was enacted as a direct response to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.1  The Court in that case held that the 
                                                
1 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Hamdan is to face a military commission 
newly designed, because of his efforts, by a Congress that finally stepped up to its responsibility, acting 
according to guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court [in the earlier Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision, 
available at 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006)]”). 
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President did not have the authority to try detainees by military commission 
without specific Congressional authorization, and that the system established 
by the President violated the requirements of the Geneva Conventions.  The 
main goal of the MCA was to establish military commissions at Guantanamo 
in which the Government could try detainees charged with war crimes.  It is 
evident that the MCA reflected two fundamental beliefs about the rule of 
law and Guantanamo: (1) that the Constitution did not apply there; and (2) 
that international treaties had no force there.  Boumediene eviscerated the 
first belief and the second is bound to suffer the same fate.     
 
In the myriad cases challenging its detention methods, the 
Government consistently argued that fundamental provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution did not apply in Guantanamo because the U.S. lacked de jure 
sovereignty there.  Accordingly, the Government’s view was that the 
Constitution did not constrain its detention policy.  This was a troubling 
assertion, but such a view was not limited to the Executive branch; the 
prevailing view by Congress’ MCA supporters was the same.2   
 
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court flatly rejected a formalistic 
approach to determining the Constitution’s reach, and instead approached 
the question functionally.  “Guantanamo . . . is no transient possession. In 
every practical sense, Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the constant 
jurisdiction of the United States.” 128 S. Ct. at 2261 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added).  The Suspension Clause explicitly limits suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus to times of “rebellion or invasion.”3 Given the 
historical importance of habeas corpus as a linchpin of liberty, the Court 
asked whether it was “impractical or anomalous” for this Constitutional 
                                                
2 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Establishing a Constitutional Process: Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 36 (statement of Sen. Sessions) (July 2006) (“But all the provisions that are 
engrafted in the United States Code, State law, and Federal constitutional privileges are not required in 
military commissions. They never have been.”) (on file with the S. Comm. on the Judiciary); 152 CONG. 
REC. S10243, 10273 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Cornyn) (stating that Guantanamo Bay 
detainees do not have constitutional rights); 152 CONG. REC. S10243, 10263 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) 
(remarks of Sen. Warner & Sen. Levin); Legal Issues Regarding Individuals Detained by the Department of 
Defense as Unlawful Enemy Combatants: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 110th Cong. 
94 (2007) (testimony of Daniel J. Dell’Orto, Principal Deputy Gen. Counsel, Department of Defense) (“If 
we talk about, now, moving [military commissions] to the United States, I think then you bump up against 
the legal aspect, and that is, are we going to have the full panoply of constitutional protections for those 
individuals, by virtue of their presence on U.S. soil?”). 
3 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.   
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protection to extend beyond the nation’s traditional borders.4  Deciding that 
it was neither, the Court concluded that Section 7 of the MCA, which 
attempted to strip federal courts of habeas jurisdiction, was therefore 
unconstitutional.  Judicial enforcement of the Suspension Clause in an area 
where the U.S. had complete jurisdiction and control, which was not in an 
active theater of war, and where there was no threat of friction with a host 
government was neither “impractical” nor “anomalous.”5  “[N]o law other 
than the laws of the United States applies at the naval station.” 128 S. Ct. at 
2251. “The United States has maintained complete and uninterrupted control 
of the bay for over 100 years.” Id. at 2258.   
  
The Court’s logic and analysis regarding habeas corpus and detention 
under the MCA apply with equal force to the military commissions also 
established by the MCA. The structure and procedures of these commissions 
clearly transgress structural limits on the powers of the U.S. government and 
violate fundamental constitutional guarantees.  In invalidating part of the 
MCA, the Boumediene Court was unequivocal.  It reminded Congress that: 
“Even when the United States acts outside its borders, its powers are not 
‘absolute and unlimited’ but are subject ‘to such restrictions as are expressed 
in the Constitution.’”6  In short, Boumediene confirmed what we already 
knew: Congress cannot switch the Constitution on and off as it pleases.  
“Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this.”7  To paraphrase 
Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, it is emphatically the duty 
and province of the Courts to say what the law is.  To hold otherwise—to let 
the political branches decide where and when the Constitution applies to 
catch the prevailing winds of the hour—would undermine foundational 
principles of separation of powers that define our system of government.   
 
It is incorrect to believe that this principle applies only to the 
Suspension Clause.  After all, habeas corpus exists to protect “the rights of 
the detained by a means consistent with the essential design of the 
Constitution.”8 Boumediene’s right to habeas corpus would be meaningless 
if there were no substantive rights to protect.  Given the myriad 
                                                
4 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255.   
5 Id. at 2261. 
6 Id. at 2259 (quotation omitted).   
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 2247.   
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constitutional defects inherent in the military commissions established under 
the MCA, Congress should consider itself on notice that the entirety of that 
system now rests on a crumbling foundation.  In light of the serious national 
security concerns at stake, Congress should be proactive and act carefully 
rather than let the current system fall apart, piece-by-piece.  It is worth 
bearing in mind that letting the system fall apart will have a number of other 
terrible consequences, including possibly having convictions reversed and 
individuals unable to be retried. 
 
The second invalid assumption of the MCA was that the treaties of the 
United States, most notably the Geneva Conventions, have no effect at 
Guantanamo.  It is frequently said that treaties are agreements between 
nations, and that courts have no business enforcing a treaty’s guarantees.  
This is true in some circumstances, but generally speaking, the Supremacy 
Clause mandates that “treaties” are part of “the supreme law of the land.”9  
Moreover, the Supreme Court already demonstrated in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
that it would invalidate a military commission system that violated the laws 
of war and the Geneva Conventions.10  Yet the existing system under the 
MCA is fatally deficient. It not only violates the Constitution, but also 
various treaties of the U.S., including Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, which guarantees a set of minimum rights for all combatants. 
 
In multiple places, the MCA seeks to limit the ability to invoke the 
Geneva Conventions as a “source of rights.”11  This appears to be a 
statement of Congress’s belief that the Geneva Conventions provide no 
independently enforceable rights, or do not create a private right of action in 
certain situations.  Such an assertion is constitutionally dubious.  Principles 
of separation of powers prevent Congress from enacting a statute that 
requires federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction “in a manner repugnant 
to the text, structure, and traditions of Article III.”12  A quintessential 
example of such an invalid statute is one that “prescribe[s] rules of decision 
to the Judicial Department.”13  The MCA does not diminish or alter the 
United States’ obligations under the Geneva Conventions.  Instead, it 
                                                
9 U.S. Const. art. VI.   
10 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).   
11 See MCA Section 3 (specifically 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g)) and MCA Section 5.   
12 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995).   
13 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 136 (1872). 
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reinforces their applicability to the military commissions it created.14  To the 
extent the MCA seeks to prevent federal courts from considering federal law 
in certain situations, it creates exactly this serious constitutional problem.  
More specifically, “Congress may limit the jurisdiction of the courts, but it 
cannot give them jurisdiction and instruct them to decide the case without 
regard to applicable federal law.”15 
 
Boumediene’s holding that detainees at Guantanamo have a right to 
habeas corpus further undermines this second assumption.  Courts 
historically have granted habeas relief for treaty violations, even when a 
treaty does not itself confer individually enforceable rights.16  In such cases, 
the treaty itself does not create the right of action or remedy for its 
violation—habeas does.  Despite assertions to the contrary in the statute 
itself, military commissions under the MCA do not comport with the Geneva 
Conventions.17  Accordingly, a court easily could find that trial by such a 
military commission is unlawful, just as the Supreme Court did two years 
ago in Hamdan.  If that happened, Congress would be forced to go back to 
the drawing board and rethink its system for dealing with detainees at 
Guantanamo.  
 
The Military Commissions Act Is Unconstitutional 
 
 The only way to solve the multiple problems created by the MCA is 
to repeal the entire law and pass one consistent with this nation’s 
Constitution and principles. As it stands, the MCA discriminates against 
people on the basis of alienage, a violation of Equal Protection principles 
that are deeply ingrained in both legal doctrine and our American narrative.  
And in further contravention of the basic guarantees of a free society, the 
                                                
14 Section 3 of the MCA (10 U.S.C. § 948b(f)) states that a military commission established under the 
MCA satisfies the requirements of Common Article 3, reaffirming the relevance and applicability of the 
Geneva Conventions in this context.   
15 Carlos M. Vazquez, The Military Commissions Act, The Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical 
Guide, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 73, 86 (2007).   
16 See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 
(1884). 
17 These arguments are analyzed in detail in two briefs filed in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia.  See Petitioner’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, 
Hamdan v. Gates, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/hamdan-reply-
on-inj-7-16-08.pdf; Amicus Brief of United Kingdom and European Union Parliamentarians, Hamdan v. 
Gates, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/parliamentarians-brief-
hamdan-7-08.pdf.  
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law burdens the fundamental right of access to the courts.  The commissions 
sanctioned by the MCA also flout international law and dispense with many 
of the procedures fundamental to the fair administration of justice, including 
the prohibition on hearsay evidence. To solve these infirmities, Congress 
should repeal the MCA and pass a law, such as the Restoring the 
Constitution Act, that uses an existing, constitutionally-sound system of 
courts or courts-martial to deal with the Guantánamo detainees. 
 
There are many constitutional problems with the MCA (to mention 
just a few of the most glaring ones, it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, 
Suspension Clause, Define & Punish Clause, Bill of Attainder Clause, and 
Due Process Clause).  For the sake of brevity, I will focus on just one: Equal 
Protection.  The Equal Protection components of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments preclude both the restriction of fundamental rights and, 
independently, government discrimination against a protected class unless 
the law in question passes strict scrutiny review.  The MCA targets both a 
fundamental right and a protected class, and as such it simply cannot survive 
the stringent constitutional standard.  The statute purports to restrict the right 
of equal access to the courts, one of the most fundamental of rights under 
our legal system.  Worse still, the line that divides those who do and do not 
receive full habeas review under the MCA is based on a patently 
unconstitutional distinction—alienage.  The onus is on this Congress and 
this Committee to recognize that we can no longer tolerate this 
unconstitutional deviation from longstanding American law in the current 
war on terror.  
 
The commissions set up by the MCA, like President Bush’s first 
attempt to set up a system of military commissions, appear to be the first 
ones in American history designed to apply only to foreigners.  The United 
States first employed military commissions in the Mexican-American war, 
where “a majority of the persons tried . . . were American citizens.”18  The 
tribunals in the Civil War naturally applied to citizens as well.  And in Ex 
parte Quirin, President Roosevelt utilized the tribunals symmetrically for the 
saboteur who claimed to be an American citizen as well as for others who 
were indisputably German nationals, prompting the Supreme Court to hold: 
                                                
18 David Glazier, Note, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging the 21st Century Military 
Commission, 89 VA. L. REV. 2005, 2030 (2005). 
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“Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve 
him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in 
violation of the law of war.”19  
 
Those who drafted the Equal Protection Clause knew all too well that 
discrimination against non-citizens must be constitutionally prohibited.  The 
Clause’s text itself reflects this principle; unlike other parts of the Section, 
which provide privileges and immunities to “citizens,” the drafters 
intentionally extended equal protection to all “persons.”20  Foremost in their 
minds was the language of Dred Scott v. Sandford, which had limited due 
process guarantees by framing them as nothing more than the “privileges of 
the citizen.”21  This language was repeatedly mentioned in the Senate 
debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, with the very first draft of the 
Amendment distinguishing between persons and citizens: “Congress shall 
have power to . . . secure to all citizens . . . the same political rights and 
privileges; and to all persons in every State equal protection in the 
enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.”22  The Amendment’s principal 
author, Representative John Bingham, asked: “Is it not essential to the unity 
of the people that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States?  Is it not essential 
. . . that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have 
equal protection . . . ?”23  
 
Moreover, drawing lines based on alienage offends all logic and 
sound policy judgment for effectively fighting the war on terror.  Our 
country understands all too well that the kind of hatred and evil that leads to 
the massacre of innocent civilians is born both at home and abroad.  And 
                                                
19 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942). 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 
388-89 (2005) (providing evidence that the Equal Protection Clause was intentionally written as it was 
specifically in order to extend certain rights to aliens); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1442-47 (1992) (same). 
21 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 449 (1857).  See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 170-72 (1998) (tracing the historical origins of the Equal 
Protection Clause and its use of the word “persons” to Dred Scott); id. at 217-18 n.* (stating that the Equal 
Protection Clause is “paradigmatically” concerned with “nonvoting aliens”). 
22 AMAR, supra, at 173 (quoting a draft of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
23 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866).  Similarly, Senator Howard stated that the Amendment 
was necessary to “disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, 
whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from denying to him the 
equal protection of the laws of the State.”  Id. at 2766. 
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nothing in the MCA, nor the DTA or the Military Order that preceded it, 
suggests that military commissions are more necessary for aliens than for 
citizens suspected of terrorist activities.  Indeed, both the Executive and 
Congress appear to believe that citizens and non-citizens pose an equal 
threat in the War on Terror.  Since the attacks of September 11th, the 
Executive has argued for presidential authority to detain and prosecute U.S. 
citizens.  And in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court agreed that “[a] 
citizen, no less than an alien, can be ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to 
the United States or coalition partners’ and ‘engaged in an armed conflict 
against the United States.’  . . . [S]uch a citizen, if released, would pose the 
same threat of returning to the front during the ongoing conflict.”24  
Likewise, this body did not differentiate between citizens and non-citizens in 
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Resolution, which provided 
the President with the authority to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001.”25   
 
The threat of terrorism knows no nationality; rather, it is a global 
plague, and its perpetrators must be brought to justice no matter what their 
country of origin.  Terrorism does not discriminate in choosing its disciples 
and neither should we in punishing those who employ this perfidious and 
cowardly tactic.  If anything, we can expect organizations such as al Qaeda 
to select, wherever possible, American citizens to carry out their despicable 
bidding. Former Attorney General Gonzales stated that “[t]he threat of 
homegrown terrorist cells . . . may be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, 
if not more so.”26  Given this sensible recognition by all three branches of 
government that the terrorist threat is not limited to non-citizens, the 
                                                
24 504 U.S. 507, 519 (2004). 
25  115 Stat. 224, note following 50 U.S.C. §1541. 
26 Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks at the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh on 
Stopping Terrorists Before They Strike: The Justice Department’s Power of Prevention (Aug. 16, 2006), 
transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_060816.html; see also Foiled 
Dirty-Bomb Plot Reveals Chilling New Threats, USA TODAY, June 11, 2002, at 10A (reporting that when 
announcing Jose Padilla’s arrest in 2002 for suspicion of planning a dirty bomb attack on U.S. soil, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft described Padilla’s American citizenship as attractive to al Qaeda because 
Padilla could move freely and easily within the United States); Jessica Stern, Op-Ed., Al Qaeda, American 
Style, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2006, at A15 (expressing concern that al Qaeda is aiming to recruit American 
citizens for domestic terror attacks). 
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disparate procedures for suspected terrorist detainees on the basis of 
citizenship simply make no sense. 
 
Further, in the wake of international disdain for and suspicion of the 
military tribunals authorized by President Bush in his Military Order, our 
country is already under global scrutiny for its disparate treatment of non-
U.S. citizens.  A letter signed by dozens of former diplomats that was sent to 
you attests that it is critical to remove this credibility gap: “To proclaim 
democratic government to the rest of the world as the supreme form of 
government at the very moment we eliminate the most important avenue of 
relief from arbitrary governmental detention will not serve our interests in 
the larger world.”27  This asymmetry will not go unnoticed.     
 
We must be careful not to further the perception that, in matters of 
justice, the American government adopts special rules that single out 
foreigners for disfavor.  If American citizens get a “Cadillac” version of 
justice, and everyone else gets a “beat-up Chevy,” the result will be fewer 
extraditions, more international condemnation, and increased enmity 
towards America worldwide.   
 
The Military Commissions Cannot Substitute for the Great Writ 
 
To the extent this Congress considers legislation related to the 
detainees, a core purpose of any Bill should be to clarify that criminal 
prosecution before a military commission cannot be a substitute for, or 
barrier to, a timely federal habeas hearing.  This would seem to be an 
unremarkable and obvious point—military commission prosecutions and 
habeas review of detentions serve two vastly different purposes.  But the 
Bush Administration has indicated that it may view criminally charging the 
detainees before military commissions as a vehicle to escape the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Boumediene that the Constitution requires the 
detainees be granted proper and timely habeas hearings.  Although only a 
fraction of the Guantanamo detainees have been criminally charged at this 
point, if the Administration’s theory were successful, it could charge a great 
number of the detainees in an effort to forestall, or foreclose altogether, their 
rights to habeas hearings.  
                                                
27 Letter from William D. Rogers et al. to Members of Congress, Sept. 25, 2006. 
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To avoid this sort of run-around, any legislation should clarify that 
whether or not a detainee is prosecuted by a military commission has no 
bearing on his right to a timely and meaningful habeas hearing to challenge 
the legality of his ongoing Executive detention.  In the rest of this Section of 
my testimony I will first explain the legal background behind this particular 
issue and explain why a military commission cannot and should not be a 
habeas replacement.  
 
Military commissions allow for the prosecution and sentencing of 
individuals who are unlawful enemy combatants and have committed war 
crimes.  Habeas hearings allow an individual who is detained to challenge 
the President’s authority to detain him, and the legality of the ongoing 
detention.  Although prosecution by military commission and review of the 
legality of executive detention are entirely different proceedings which serve 
wholly different functions, the Bush Administration has indicated that it 
views prosecution before a military commission as a substitute to a habeas 
hearing.28 
 
To begin, there is no doubt that individuals detained at Guantanamo 
Bay all have the same right to habeas corpus, whether or not they are to be 
tried by military commission.  The Administration itself conceded this point, 
at an earlier stage of the litigation involving Mr. Hamdan, when it stated to 
the Supreme Court that: “If th[e] Court holds in Boumediene and Al Odah 
that enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay may petition for habeas corpus 
to challenge their detention notwithstanding the MCA, there is no reason to 
suppose that its holding would not apply to those enemy combatants who 
have been designated for trial by military commission.”29  
 
Under longstanding Supreme Court doctrine, as reaffirmed in 
Boumediene, unless Congress formally suspends the writ, it can only remove 
                                                
28 See, e.g., Gov’t Br. in Opp’n to Pet’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 20 (July 14, 2008), Hamdan v. 
Gates, No. 04-CV-1519-JR (D.D.C.) (asserting that habeas review into Hamdan’s designation as an enemy 
combatant is not necessary because the commissions themselves, “in conjunction with review by [the D.C. 
Circuit], certainly comprise a sufficient habeas substitute. . . .”). 
29 Br. in Opp’n to Cert., Hamdan v. Gates, No. 07-15, at 12; see also id. at 10 (“[t]he jurisdictional 
provision of the MCA makes no distinction between aliens detained as enemy combatants and those who 
are also subject to trial by military commission, see MCA § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2636, and petitioner provides no 
reason why any decision of this Court in Boumediene and Al Odah would not apply to him.”). 
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jurisdiction over habeas petitions from federal courts if it provides an 
adequate alternative or substitute process.30  The Supreme Court held in 
Boumediene that a CSRT conducted by the military, and the limited review 
provided by the DTA, are not adequate alternatives to the writ of habeas 
corpus guaranteed in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.31   
 
 There are at least five reasons why trial by a military commission is 
no substitute for a detainee’s right to a timely habeas hearing to challenge 
his ongoing Executive detention. 
 
 First, and most significantly, any habeas hearing to challenge the 
legality of a detention must have, as a possible outcome, the detainee’s 
ultimate release from unlawful detention.  This is the very purpose of the 
writ of habeas corpus.  But the military commission process does not 
contemplate or permit this result.  Even if a military commission proceeding 
results in an acquittal,32 or a conviction is ultimately overturned, the 
detainee’s captivity continues.33 There is simply no mechanism in a military 
commission or the D.C. Circuit review of a commission that is prescribed by 
the MCA to end unlawful Executive detention. 
 
 Second, military commissions and habeas hearings serve entirely 
different purposes.  The purpose of the constitutional habeas hearing 
recognized in Boumediene is to determine whether the President has 
authority to hold an individual as an enemy combatant.  The purpose of a 
military commission is to criminally prosecute an individual for violating the 
laws of war.  One foundational aspect of the laws of war is that certain 
people are entitled to prisoner of war (POW) or combatant immunity, and so 
cannot be criminally prosecuted for their participation in hostilities.  Thus, 
                                                
30 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262 (questioning “whether the statute stripping jurisdiction to issue the 
writ avoids the Suspension Clause mandate because Congress has provided adequate substitute procedures 
for habeas corpus” and finding the substitute to be inadequate). 
31 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274 (“[T]he DTA review process is, on its face, an inadequate substitute 
for habeas corpus.”). 
32 I would note, also, the statement of my distinguished co-panelist today, the former Chief Prosecutor of 
the Military Commissions, Col. Mo Davis.  See Josh White, From Chief Prosecutor To Critic at 
Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2008, at A1 (quoting former Chief Prosecutor Col. Morris Davis 
recalling the Defense Department General Counsel stating “‘We’ve been holding these guys for years. How 
can we explain acquittals? We have to have convictions.’”). 
33 See Jeffrey Toobin, Camp Justice; Everyone Wants to Close Guantanamo, but What Will Happen to the 
Detainees?, NEW YORKER, Apr. 14, 2008, at 32. 
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one of the few defenses available to a defendant before a military 
commission is to argue that he is a lawful combatant and so cannot be tried.  
But, requiring a defendant in a military commission to argue that he is a 
lawful combatant entitled to POW status would force him to argue directly 
against his interests in a habeas hearing, where the detainee would wish to 
argue he is not a combatant at all.  In sum, because a military commission is 
engaged in a fundamentally different inquiry than a habeas court, a 
commission will not hear the proper arguments to evaluate the legality of a 
defendant’s detention.  By design, the commission cannot possibly substitute 
for the habeas hearing. 
 
Third, the procedures used by a military commission may be 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance in Boumediene on the 
requisite elements of a proper habeas hearing.  For example, the commission 
permits the admission into evidence of testimony extracted by coercion.34  
So too, hearsay is readily admissible in commission proceedings, gravely 
undermining the right of confrontation.35  In addition, the commission has 
already ruled that the sharply curtailed right against self-incrimination 
afforded to defendants under the MCA “is at odds with the balance of 
American jurisprudence.”36  And as I said earlier, military commission 
defendants are stripped of any right to invoke the Geneva Conventions, 
which are crucial in determining whether an individual may be detained as 
an enemy combatant.37  These are just some of the reasons why a military 
commission proceeding lacks the proper procedures for a habeas hearing.  It 
is for these reasons, moreover, that a military commission’s own 
jurisdictional decision about whether a detainee is a so-called “unlawful 
enemy combatant” is likewise insufficient as a habeas substitute. 
 
Fourth, the D.C. Circuit review of the final judgment of a military 
commission that is provided by the MCA is far more restricted than the 
review of CSRTs provided by the DTA—which the Supreme Court in 
Boumediene has already found an inadequate habeas substitute.38  Most 
significantly, unlike the DTA-provided review of CSRTs, the MCA does not 
                                                
34 See 10 U.S.C. § 948r. 
35 See 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(E). 
36 See Ruling on Motion to Suppress (D-030) at 3, United States v. Hamdan. 
37 See 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g). 
38 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263–69. 
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permit any review of the factual findings and determinations of the military 
commission.  When reviewing a military commission, “the Court of Appeals 
may act only with respect to matters of law.”39  By contrast, the DTA 
requires judicial review of facts for challenges to CSRTs.40  So, too, the 
MCA has a more restrictive provision than the DTA for the D.C. Circuit to 
look to the “Constitution and the laws of the United States.”41  Given that the 
Supreme Court has already found the DTA federal review provisions to be 
inadequate, it goes without saying that these inferior provisions in the MCA 
cannot suffice as a habeas substitute. 
  
Fifth, as the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Boumediene, the writ of 
habeas corpus commands timely access to a hearing to review the factual 
and legal basis of the ongoing Executive detention.  Many of the detainees 
have already been held in captivity at Guantanamo Bay and denied a habeas 
hearing for nearly seven years.42  Given that the delay up to this point 
already conflicts with the core concept of habeas, a further delay to await the 
conclusion of military commission trials and review would be deeply 
problematic.  Indeed, the military commissions have already demonstrated 
that they are incapable of a speedy trial, and the MCA places no time limit 
on when a military commission judgment must be finalized, raising the 
specter that they could be drawn out indefinitely to prevent detainees from 
ever getting a day in court.  The near certainty of lengthy additional delay is 
thus another reason not to view military commission proceedings as a habeas 
substitute. 
 
 For these reasons, a criminal trial before a military commission should 
not be considered to serve as a substitute to a detainee’s right to challenge 
the legality of his detention in a federal habeas proceeding.  Given the Bush 
Administration’s indication that it may view military commissions as a 
                                                
39 10 U.S.C. § 950g(b). 
40 See DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i) (with respect to CSRTs the D.C. Circuit must ensure “that the conclusion of 
the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the evidence”). 
41 Compare the MCA provision on this point, 10 U.S.C. § 950g(c), with the DTA provision, DTA § 
1005(e)(3)(D), 119 Stat. at 2743. 
42 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263 (“[T]he fact that these detainees have been denied meaningful access 
to a judicial forum for a period of years render these cases exceptional.”); see also id. at 2275 (that waiting 
for the D.C. Circuit to address the sufficiency of DTA review “would be to require additional months, if not 
years, of delay”). 
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habeas substitute, Congress should consider explicitly making this point 
clear in any legislation. 
 
Next Steps:  A National Security Court? 
 
 Moving forward, perhaps the most important line in last month’s 
Boumediene opinion belonged to Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent: After the 
Supreme Court in 2004 gave Guantanamo detainees the right to habeas 
corpus, “Congress responded 18 months later . . . [and] cannot be faulted for 
taking that time to consider how best to accommodate both the detainees’ 
interests and the need to keep the American people safe.” 128 S. Ct. at 2282 
n.1. 
 
 Some are ignoring the Chief’s wise words and calling immediately for 
legislation to create a national security court as a response to the 
Boumediene decision.  I support a security court.  But the litany of policy 
questions that surround it are far too massive to be tackled in the next few 
months, right before a presidential election.  Rushing ahead is a huge 
mistake that will weaken American security. 
 
 The current system of detention is totally broken.  The current 
Administration has been asserting an open-ended power to detain people 
forever with little or no serious process.  The result of its system not only 
has been that the truly innocent could potentially be detained forever, but 
also that the seriously guilty could call themselves mere shepherds and 
escape the consequences of criminal conviction.  The Supreme Court wisely 
shut that system down.  Now, what is needed is a serious plan to prosecute 
everyone we can in regular courts, and a separate system to deal with the 
small handful of cases in which patently dangerous people cannot be tried. 
 
 That’s where a national security court could come in—a system that 
would be staffed by federal judges, with experienced counsel on both sides, 
in which the government would have an ability to temporarily detain a 
dangerous individual.  It might only come into being after a criminal trial 
has failed.  Or it might be limited in other ways—from a numerical cap on 
the number of detainees in the system to innovative ideas such as forcing the 
government to give an escalating amount of money in foreign aid to the 
country of origin of each detainee for every additional month of detention.  
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Every aspect of the system is up for grabs—from the rules of evidence to the 
length of an initial detention period and what an appeals system would look 
like.  The point here is simply that there are literally hundreds of different 
models from which to choose. 
 
 And yet each of those models will differ from our traditional system 
of justice.  Americans take pride in our criminal trial system—and our 
system works best when we convict terrorists in our court system.  We 
showcase the rule of law—and contrast it with the despicable world of the 
enemy, who lacks respect for our way of life and our values.  If we are to 
modify our system, even in the slightest of ways, we should do so 
cautiously, with appreciation for the risks involved. 
 
 The very worst time to contemplate such changes is a few months 
before a major election (and particularly when both presidential candidates 
have announced that they will change policy and close Guantanamo).  A 
rush to judgment produces sloganeering without a sustainable product.  
Consider what happened before the last election: The Supreme Court struck 
down President Bush’s Guantanamo trial system and Geneva Convention 
policies in June of 2006, and the Congress fast-tracked new legislation to try 
to overturn the Supreme Court three months later in the form of the MCA.  
Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle warned that this legislation 
was unconstitutional and would be struck down by the courts.  But the 
Administration did not listen.  And so here we are again, nearly seven years 
after the horrible 9-11 attacks with only half of a single trial completed at 
Guantanamo Bay, and that very law, the MCA, already struck down in part 
by the Supreme Court.   
 
 We need a better plan than simply looking tough if we want to 
demonstrate to our courts and the world that we are serious about terrorism.  
This country desperately needs, and deserves, a serious inquiry, perhaps 
catalyzed by a bipartisan national commission, to examine whether a 
national security court is necessary and, if so, what it should look like. 
 
 We have spent far too many years with intemperate solutions that 
have gotten us nowhere.  Many warned the Administration that it needed a 
plan for the day after the Supreme Court’s highly predictable decision to 
restore basic rights to the Guantanamo detainees—but it stubbornly clung to 
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notions of executive power that the Supreme Court in Boumediene 
eviscerated.  If we rush into a national security court, we will need another 
plan for the next predictable “day after.”   
 
Conclusion 
 
In light of the rampant constitutional and treaty-based defects that 
infect the entire military commission system established by the MCA, I am 
grateful for the attention that this Committee, and the Congress as a whole, 
is expending on this matter. I am pleased to answer any questions that you 
might have.     
      
 
